Ivo Daalder and I.M. Destler have written an interesting and valuable study of the role of the National Security Advisor, assessing the office generally, as well as the operating methods and achievements of each of its incumbents individually. It's well worth a read because it helps us understand the degree to which the holder of the title can literally make or break the foreign policy reputation of a President. The influence is not (usually) because the Advisor gets directly involved in formulating policy, but because he/she is the one person in government who works directly for and only for the President's interest, ensuring that decisions are properly "staffed," and that all options and pitfalls are considered.
Three points of the book seemed particularly noteworthy to me. First that the Advisor must have the trust of the President and a working style that complements his. That's self-evident, I suppose, but Daalder and Destler demonstrate in their case studies how often this simple principle has been ignored, usually with undesirable consequences. A related point is that nearly every new Administration started out with an arrangement that needed fairly extensive adjustment, an adjustment often brought on by the ineffective handling of some crisis. Sometimes the solution was an adjustment in working style, sometimes a new NS Advisor, sometimes a shift in the flow of information.
Second, and also not surprising, is that the NSA's relationship with the Secretary of State is fraught with pitfalls; bruised egos, dropped balls, resentments have been more the rule than the exception.
Finally, in terms of modern political history, I read with interest the book's assessment of Condi Rice's performance in the job. The authors describe a Rice who took more than a few lumps from several more senior Cabinet officials, but who nevertheless had the President's strong confidence. They fault her for failing to ensure that the President and his team considered all the options in important decisions (to go to war in Iraq, for example, without thinking through a postwar strategy). At the same time, however, they quote Rice to the effect that she didn't try to cross all the t's because she knew the President's style (a quick decision and no afterthoughts); she believed he was uninterested in such "details." I'm sure her assessment was correct, yet as the authors argue, it's the duty of the Security Advisor to try.
The position of National Security Advisor really only began with Kennedy, though Eisenhower had a staff chief with somewhat similar functions. Thus it is new enough that it is still being defined. It will be interesting to see how the Obama administration develops it, and what sort of NS Advisor Gen. Jones will turn out to be. So far, it is unclear what role Jones may have played in last weekend's successful operation to free merchant Capt. Richard Phillips from Somali pirates.
(Note: Buy the book by clicking the amazon.com widget in the right margin.)
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