Opinionmakers from across the political spectrum are now emerging in swarms to condemn, praise, or second-guess the Obama plan for the conflict in Afghanistan. By and large, commentators seem to commiserate with President Obama, and concede that "what to do about Afghanistan" is a very difficult, if not impossible, question. There's no clear and obvious choice that can guarantee us a "positive" outcome.
So, in today's Washington Post, George Will suggests that the plan won't work because it's not exactly what Bush did in Iraq, and he seems to lean toward bailing out as soon as possible. E.J. Dionne correctly notes that Obama tried to seek out a middle ground that may not exist in today's political environment. The Post itself does an OK job of pointing out how (in minor ways) Obama's plan differs from McChrystal's. One of the best views, I think, is from Robert Kagan, who credits Obama with extreme political courage and notes that Presidents alone take the heat for their decisions. If things turn out badly, members of Congress will duck; if the result is favorable, they'll be celebrating their wisdom.
Which brings me to my main point here. The definition of the ideal outcome depends on who's talking, of course, and that may be part of the problem. We rushed into the war in Afghanistan on a few weeks' notice as a way of punishing the Taliban for harboring al-Qaeda. As in Iraq (possibly even more than in Iraq), no one did much thinking about the longer term goals -- not defining them, not considering what to do if we didn't achieve them. It goes without saying that what we achieve, or don't, in Afghanistan will inevitably be judged in the very short term - we might hope that voters won't expect calm waters by November 2010, but we can be certain they will by November 2012. And the political chips will fall based on our collective mood at that time.
Ultimately, we won't know for at least 50 years whether we succeeded or failed in Afghanistan; whether our efforts made a difference, and whether it was favorable to our interests. We have about reached that point with regard to Vietnam, where it would appear our efforts were largely irrelevant. We failed to prevent a "communist takeover," but the region now is more peaceful than it was, and our own relationship - with Vietnam and with other regional powers - is being normalized. By 2059, the current controversy over Afghanistan will be ancient history, but the consequences of our policies will be more clearly visible.
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