Morning Fog

Terrorism And Religion - Are They The Same Thing?

No reasonable person could look back on human history over the past two millennia and not think that an awful lot of murder and mayhem has been committed in the name of religion.  Violence has been done, not just in conflicts between two different religions over basic tenets of faith, but in matters so petty as how many fingers to use when crossing oneself.

The problem with religion, as I see it, is that it tends toward absolutism.  If you take the guiding principles of your life on faith, reason doesn't enter in, and that doesn't leave much room for shades of gray -- at least not in many people's minds.  When you're right, you're right.  Right?  So far too often, despite the fact that all major religions teach tolerance, the actual result is the opposite:  intolerance.

And thus we come to terrorism, or at least the main brand of terrorism prevailing in the world today -- that of Muslims who get a little too wrapped up in the "rightness" of their faith and aren't willing to tolerate the faiths of others.  Hence the case of "Jihad Jane," whose target allegedly was the Swedish artist Lars Vilks; his offense was to depict Allah with the body of a dog.  Surely an offense to Muslims, especially conservative ones -- but cause for murder? Get a life, guys and gals. Get some tolerance.

Not that the shoe isn't often on the other foot, as we can see when upstanding (?) politicians of the Virginia state assembly object to a Muslim imam's giving the opening prayer as that body opens its session next week.  It isn't violence yet; it isn't terrorism; but it's the same idea.

Cheney's Detainees

I watched former Veep Richard Cheney on ABC-TV this morning.  He didn't say a lot that was new or surprising (thus not living up to the network's promotional spots).  In fact, the one thing that stood out most about his performance was that it was subdued, reasonable. 

He repeated some of his well-known views (terrorism is a war, and terrorists should not be handled as common criminal cases) and in many cases, suggested that on security issues, the Obama administration is often following a path of continuity with Bush policies.  And that is basically true.  Foreign policy and security issues have always enjoyed a greater degree of bipartisanship and continuity between administrations than other subject matter.  Sometimes that's by choice (stability of policies reassures both our allies and enemies) and sometimes by necessity (an inherited ongoing war can't be stopped overnight).

But that doesn't explain the new, calmly spoken Cheney.  It's as if he's reined in his visceral hatred of the Obama administration.  Is it because his viscera are just more at ease now, after several cardiac episodes?  Is it because he is now, at a greater distance of time, able to be less judgmental?  Is it because he is more optimistic about Republican chances to regain seats in Congress?  Or is it (as I guess) that somebody on the Republican side has managed to persuade him that his more outlandish fulminations were damaging Republican prospects for the fall elections?  Not that the motive matters.

The question of how best to handle the Guantánamo detainees, in which Cheney has continued to insist on his way of doing things, is one of those cases where continuity becomes a headache.  It's an inherited problem, arrived at through a Bush-Cheney policy that the current administration thinks is dead wrong.  In trying to correct it the Administration is finding lots of bumps in the road, including Congressional cold feet on bringing detainees into the U.S., and most recently of course, the NIMBY need to find a new venue for the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed*, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. 

[* Incidentally, the press is calling him KSM for short, but I kind of like "Shake Mo'" and imagine him becoming a rapper from his detention cell.] 

I think this whole issue may be the rare case where continuity can mesh directly with discontinuity.  Why not draw a line under the inherited detainees, declare that they are a preëxisting problem, created under a policy that we may question now, but manifestly incapable of resolution on other terms? -- and then move ahead smartly with military tribunals.  Let's face hard facts: 98% of Americans could care less what happens to these detainees; a few may be concerned about "fairness" but on the other hand, is it "fair" to the detainees, after years, to switch horses and try them in a completely different way?  There's no reason for this administration to accept the opprobrium of this error, or to shoulder the political burden of attempting to sell the idea of regular criminal trials to a skeptical/hostile public, judiciary, and Congress. 

Cheney said today he won't be surprised if KSM ended up being tried at a military tribunal.  I wouldn't either.  Politics - the art of compromise, the art of the possible, the art of sausage-making; but also the art of finding practical solutions to problems.  Why not bite that bullet and move on with all those trials?  A new policy can be applied to such persons as may fall into U.S. custody after January 20, 2009.   

And Now, Rethinking Security

After a few days of everyone reflexively shooting off their mouths about the Nigerian Christmas terrorist, it seems thinking is now becoming a little more reflective, focusing more on finding solutions that might be effective, rather than knee-jerk measures that solve nothing.

On December 29, for example, the Washington Post stepped back a bit from its overwrought editorial the previous day, and came out in favor of equipping the TSA on an urgent basis with the scanning equipment that could detect liquid explosives or other foreign objects under clothing.   Today, they plumped in favor of better communication and coordination among intelligence agencies, an idea that's also been the centerpiece of Pres. Obama's statements about "systemic failure."  Both these are sensible suggestions, and both have far more potential to be effective than superficial measures like keeping everyone in their seats for the last hour of a flight.

Both ideas are eminently practical but let's keep in mind a few things as we go about devising a response:

• Improved scanners, better intel cooperation: the concepts are all the more sensible since they were promised -- but not delivered -- by the Bush administration more than 8 years ago. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't implement them now, though, if we can - it seems Republican politicians might even in favor of doing so (but will they still, when they realize it costs money?). The point here is not to bash Republicans (though those now accusing negligence might wish to recall they dwell in the same glass house), but to highlight that politics, inertia, and conflicting priorities do tend to intervene in the best-laid plans; what can we put in place to ensure that there will be enough follow-through (by both parties, in the national interest) to implement whatever we decide to do now?
• It was only by chance that Abdulmutallab happened to be on any list at all. He might just as easily have been someone whose history and activities had not attracted any intelligence attention. This means that who-shot-John recriminations about why he wasn't on this list or that list are unhelpful, and take our eye off the target. Terrorists will soon learn to recruit complete unknowns, so while streamlining watchlists may be helpful, it's only a short-run tactic.
• So let's not put all our eggs in that one basket - or any other one basket, because what we're really doing is fighting the last battle. We should recall that 9/11 became possible only because flight crews were trained to acceed to terrorist attempts to take over an airplane. We had failed to think outside the box as well as the terrorists did, failed to consider that a plane full of people could be a very effective bomb. We can ill afford to make the same mistake again.

Misunderstanding Security

I hate to beat a dead horse, but some of the reactions I'm hearing to the Christmas bomber incident in the 12 hours since my last post drive me to revisit the issue of how we should react to such news. 

First, I'd suggest that the "balanced" approach being attributed to President Obama in the press -- ordering some immediate measures (even if the efficacy of some of them is dubious); considering stepping up the use of better screening technology despite the resistance of "privacy" advocates; and generally refusing to make a huge fuss over the whole affair -- is a reasonable one.  

Terrorism is a bit like bank robbery; banks have been seeking ways to prevent robberies for - what, maybe a century and a half? - but people are still finding ways to rob banks, sometimes getting caught by preventive measures, sometimes by their own mistakes, and sometimes not getting caught at all.  We don't generally blame the bank managers or the CEO; we don't declare the entire banking system to be in crisis; and we don't strip search the bank customers.  A similarly measured response is called for in the case of a terrorist act.

One Congressman, Peter Hoekstra, doesn't seem to understand that point; he is being quoted heavily in the press today as follows:

Michigan's Peter Hoekstra, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, said that the Obama administration should be held accountable for the near-catastrophe aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253. Hoekstra said that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's presence on the flight was part of a pattern of administration neglect on preparedness questions, stemming from a failure to recognize essential dangers. "The threat to the United States is real. I think this administration has downplayed it," he said on Fox News.

(Incidentally, I assume from this that Hoekstra also holds the Bush administration "accountable" for September 11; did he argue for impeachment back then?)

Now, as a senior member of the House Intel Committee, Hoekstra ought to understand the bank-robber nature of the threat that we face, and he ought to know, better than he appears to, how intelligence works (i.e., no single report like that which Abdulmatallab's father made can ever be a basis for action).   So either Hoekstra is ignorant of some basic facts about intelligence or (my guess) he's just using the recent incident for political advantage.   Neither explanation of his motive reflects well on him; either he has not taken his duties on the committee seriously enough to learn the subject matter, or he has chosen to play politics with national security (as have other Republicans this year).  Either way, he seems to be acting out of fear when none is justified.

Fear also underlies the Washington Post's editorial today, "Unconnected Dots."  This overreactive piece seems to have been dashed off in a hurry - a frightened hurry - and it takes the same unrealistic approach to terrorism and counterterrorism as Hoekstra.  The Post talks about failures of the screening system (yet it goes without saying any such system - especially one dependent on human inspectors -- will have flaws that terrorists will eventually learn to exploit); it suggests the single report from the terrorist's father should have "catapulted" Abdulmutallab to a higher level of scrutiny (yet there may be 500, or 5000 such reports a day, and only one in six months that really means anything); and it calls the administration response "defensive" (yet it's entirely appropriate to the bank-robber model). 

So many talking heads, so little understanding. 

Terrified

The would-be Christmas bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, might have been successful in blowing up a plane over Detroit* if his equipment had not malfunctioned.  Terribly, terrifically, terrifying terrorism?  Well yes, in one respect certainly: Had he succeeded (and even when he didn't), the incident brings home to us again the reality of terrorism in today's world, the frightening thought (if we bother to think about it) that lives - possibly including our own - could be snuffed out unexpectedly. 

(* Why Detroit? I hope investigators will look closely for clues as to Abdulmutallab's choice of target.  Had he bought a Chevy in the past couple of years?  Was he a Lions fan?) 

But that's not what terrifies me. My philosophy on terrorism is that it exists; incidents will inevitably occur, including here in the U.S., in spite of anything Bush, Obama, or even Oprah may have done or failed to do; and we can't provide absolute security against it.

That being the case, let's not completely alter our everyday lives (which means the terrorists win), nor react stupidly, in the hopes of preventing the unpreventable.  Of course with appropriate measures we can and should try to minimize the risks of terrorist attack.  Certainly we don't want to make it so easy that we end up with every third plane being blown out of the sky.  

But too often, the preventive steps we take seem to be lowest-denominator steps with limited effectiveness.  After the Twin Towers attack, we forbade travelers from carrying anything sharp or pointy, even a toothpick or a knitting needle.  After several years of that silliness, some of the more ridiculous rerstrictions were finally lifted, and with good reason -- not only were some of the banned items basically harmless, but after the example of 9/11, did anyone really believe an airline steward or pilot would allow him/herself to be threatened into giving up control of the plane when confronted by a penknife?   Now we all take off our shoes before boarding an airplane, and we have to give up most liquids even when they're "declared" and carried in plain sight.

No, it's not the prospect of being blown out of the sky that is most frightening to me; it's the prospect of still more un-thought-out, ineffective countermeasures that will only serve to weigh us down psychologically, commercially, and in other ways.  Within hours of the failed Detroit attack, journalists and security officials had begun to preach the new gospel of the ridiculous:  passengers would be forbidden to have blankets (Abdulmutallab hid his device under his blanket), or would be required to stay in their seats during the last hour of a flight before landing (because Mr. A. went to the toilet to rig himself up during that last hour).  But if restrictions forbid movement during the last hour, wouldn't even the dumbest terrorist just figure out a way to go "live" sooner than that?

So let's exercise some common sense in our approach to counterterrorism.  We could begin by not publishing the complete details of the TSA's exact screening procedures and specifications on the internet, for example.  Let's be more analytical about what may be effective, and what's just window dressing.  I don't have a lot of confidence that we're operating that way now, or at any time in the past 8 years.

Afghanistan - Can The Debate Last 50 Years?

Opinionmakers from across the political spectrum are now emerging in swarms to condemn, praise, or second-guess the Obama plan for the conflict in Afghanistan. By and large, commentators seem to commiserate with President Obama, and concede that "what to do about Afghanistan" is a very difficult, if not impossible, question.  There's no clear and obvious choice that can guarantee us a "positive" outcome.   

So, in today's Washington Post, George Will suggests that the plan won't work because it's not exactly what Bush did in Iraq, and he seems to lean toward bailing out as soon as possible.  E.J. Dionne correctly notes that Obama tried to seek out a middle ground that may not exist in today's political environment.  The Post itself does an OK job of pointing out how (in minor ways) Obama's plan differs from McChrystal's.  One of the best views, I think, is from Robert Kagan, who credits Obama with extreme political courage and notes that Presidents alone take the heat for their decisions.  If things turn out badly, members of Congress will duck; if the result is favorable, they'll be celebrating their wisdom.

Which brings me to my main point here.  The definition of the ideal outcome depends on who's talking, of course, and that may be part of the problem.  We rushed into the war in Afghanistan on a few weeks' notice as a way of punishing the Taliban for harboring al-Qaeda.  As in Iraq (possibly even more than in Iraq), no one did much thinking about the longer term goals -- not defining them, not considering what to do if we didn't achieve them.  It goes without saying that what we achieve, or don't, in Afghanistan will inevitably be judged in the very short term - we might hope that voters won't expect calm waters by November 2010, but we can be certain they will by November 2012.  And the political chips will fall based on our collective mood at that time. 

Ultimately, we won't know for at least 50 years whether we succeeded or failed in Afghanistan; whether our efforts made a difference, and whether it was favorable to our interests.   We have about reached that point with regard to Vietnam, where it would appear our efforts were largely irrelevant.  We failed to prevent a "communist takeover," but the region now is more peaceful than it was, and our own relationship - with Vietnam and with other regional powers - is being normalized.  By 2059, the current controversy over Afghanistan will be ancient history, but the consequences of our policies will be more clearly visible.

At Last, The Afghanistan Plan

I wanted to hear the President's speech before commenting on his long-awaited plan for Afghanistan, though most of the details had already been made public.  In particular, I was interested in what he might say about Pakistan in the context of this Afghanistan decision. Any successful effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the region will have to involve both countries.  Militarily, Pakistan will have to do its part in the border regions as U.S. forces and the Afghans they may train do theirs.  The stability of both governments is essential but contrarily, the military action Pakistan needs to undertake will not be helpful to its already fragile stability.  On this point, I was disappointed; the President's nostrums about aid to, and cooperation with, Pakistan failed to draw the strong link that's needed. 

Back home in the U.S., everyone will have his own slant, based on political dogmas and received wisdom, but I want to focus on the Democrats who are opposing the deployment of more troops.  They need to face a few realities.

First: It's true that Obama ends up "owning" the war at this point, but that should not be a surprise.  Weren't they listening?  This is the war he said during the campaign was truly important; now, he's just sticking to his guns.  He reiterated the argument at length during his speech at West Point.  Unusual, but not impossible, for a politician to follow through on campaign promises that turn out to be politically unpopular.  Democrats who stand on one principle (which is, evidently, "war is never the answer,") ought to appreciate Obama's insisting on a different one. 

Second:  Even if that weren't the case, any move to pull immediately out of Afghanistan would be unwise.  It would mean our efforts to date had accomplished nothing, it would leave a job unfinished, and it would create a situation on the ground that can easily be exploited by the Taliban and/or al-Queda.  Like it or not, we have to live with the Bush Administration's misjudgments -- that the war would be quickly and cheaply, nothwithstanding the experience of many other powers in Afghanistan -- and make the best of them in order to preserve a degree of U.S. credibility in the region and in the world.   A President inheriting a war from a predecessor will always be hard put to end it.

Third, Democrats ought to see here an opportunity to overcome their party's consistent reputation for being weak on defense and national security.  True or not, that's the broad public perception.   The President is (largely) heeding his military advisors, is focusing on a military-strategic goal (weakening terrorism), but at the same time hopes to set specific goals to be achieved as the benchmarks of success, and a timetable for finishing the job.  It's a promise to square the circle:  we're determined to stay the course, yet we plan to be out within a couple of years.  If he makes it good, the gain in national security will be the chief benefit, yet a "win" in the Democratic column could help achieve a better balance between public perceptions of the two parties on this set of issues.  If he fails, the political point is lost, perhaps, but not so disastrously as if he had acted against his military strategists' recommendations.

Meanwhile, as the buildup goes forward, we can of course expect our enemies in Afghanistan/Pakistan to step up efforts to carry off splashy setbacks to U.S. efforts, especially in the period before most of the new forces can be deployed.  We may hope that journalists and politicians won't succumb to hysteria each time one of these events happens; we will be disappointed.

On Afghanistan, It's Time

At least two columnists argue today that President Obama needs to make a decision on troops for Afghanistan and move ahead with it.  David Broder, in Enough Afghan Debate, says the internal discussion has been stretched "to the breaking point" and it's time to bring it to an end.  (Broder favors the McChrystal argument for more troops.)  Jackson Diehl, in "Obama's Reluctant Choice", suggests that Obama has to not just make a decision, but to demonstrate he believes the war in Afghanistan is really worth fighting.  Both writers accuse the President of "dithering," a word that's being used a lot elsewhere, too.

I agree with both of them, and last month pointed out the need to make the jump from lawyerly deliberation to active decision-making soon.  It hasn't happened.  What are the consequences?  Broder suggests that our commanders need to know, troop deployments need to begin, our allies must have certainty about U.S. intentions...all very true, but I think Diehl gets a little closer to the crux in saying that a couple more weeks won't have a great impact on the course of the war.  The real impact of the lengthy review and constant raising of new questions to be answered is on Obama's credibility as a decision-maker and on that front, the damage unfortunately is already done, and whatever decision comes now will already be too late to repair it. 

New York Terrorist Trials

The Obama Administration has decided to try a handful of the Guantánamo detainees in civilian courts in New York City.  While I'm sure this was a difficult decision for Attorney-General Holder and others, it seems to me the correct one.  It fulfills an Obama campaign pledge, it begins the process of extracting us from a Cheney-Bush mistake that made a mockery of our justice system, and it reaffirms that we're a nation of laws.  Could this possibly be controversial, and if so, why?

According to many Republican politicians, it can be and is.  If we take the word of House Minority Leader John Boehner, for example, their reasons lie in the realms of security (what if there is violence because of the trials?), publicity (what if the accused use the media to get attention for their views?) and incredibly, the possibility that the plotters might be found innocent, due to some "legal technicality."  (My emphasis, Boehner's words.)  

I'm dumbstruck by this line of argument.  Can the Republican Party, the voice of conservatism, the self-proclaimed defender of the U.S. Constitution and the American tradition which includes the rule of law, really not see how the other option (trial in closed military courts without the "niceties" of civilian rules of evidence) flies in the face of that tradition? 

Maybe Boehner should have a look at some of those old Ronald Reagan and John Wayne Westerns, in which the local sheriff stands alone to keep the lynch mob away from his prisoner, even if there might be some violence, or publicity for the prisoner's side of the story, so that the varmint can have a fair trial and maybe, just maybe, even be found innocent.  This is a drama that's playing out today, with a new cast:  Obama as the sheriff, Holder maybe as his stalwart deputy, the town-hall objector crowd as the mob and Boehner, apparently, as their spokesman.  In a saner, less partisan world, the GOP should be the old drunken has-been lawyer in town who is prevailed upon to sober up, break open his dusty old law books, and defend the accused.

The concern that Khalid Sheik Muhammed and his four partners in crime might be found innocent particularly attracts my attention, for that normally is cited as one of the strengths of our legal system.  

I wonder if anyone recalls the Angela Davis case back in 1970-72.  Ms. Davis, a Communist, a Black Panther, definitely a radical, was arrested in a case involving the murder of a judge.  She, her lawyers, and other supporters claimed at the time that she could never get a fair trial, yet she was acquitted.  The charges and countercharges surrounding the trial, in a period of intense left-right partisanship not so different from what we are experiencing today, were heated, and they were front-page news.  I suppose the verdict upset the right-wingers of the day, but I always thought it showed the strength and resiliency of our legal system.  Reading the Wikipedia article on Angela Davis today (link above), it's just amazing to see how short and matter-of-fact the paragraph about this trial is, compared to the furor it sparked at the time. We might conclude that the verdict averted a situation in which Ms. Davis might have become a martyr, or her trial might have touched off more controversy, or even violence -- and that's also a strength of our system.

The politics of the New York trials is clear.  The main difficulty in Holder's decision was concern about the political fallout from the mob.  Today's Republicans oppose anything and everything done or proposed by the Obama administration.  If that's a viable strategy at all, it shouldn't be applied in a way that weakens our commitment to the rule of law.  And (to address another GOP bugaboo I've heard), it's our law, and our tradition, that we want to preserve.  We're not doing this for a bunch of "furriners," but for ourselves. 

Last but not least, I should note there's another source of opposition to the Holder decision. At least some of the relatives of the 9/11 victims also object, evidently on pretty much the same grounds.  Those who do can be forgiven for their emotionalism, but for them there's a principle that should always apply:  the victims of a crime do not, and should not, have any influence in how justice is meted out. 

Hasan The Terrorist?

Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan went off the rails a few days ago and killed a lot of innocent people.  We've had so many incidents of this kind over the years - we're familiar with the typology of these crimes.  Just within driving distance of my own house, we've had the shootings at Virginia Tech a few years ago, the closer-to-home killings committed by the "Beltway Sniper" John Muhammad,*  and the 80-year-old Nazi who attacked the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, to name but a few.

Something must be different about this one, though, because suddenly the specter of "terrorism" has arisen.  Two things are indeed different:  The perpetrator is a Muslim, and the shootings took place on an Army base.  But that's not much of a difference.  Everything so far supports the idea of another angry, isolated, wacko going off the deep end.  Examining the internet activities and reading habits of these characters after the fact is standard, and in most cases, they show connections to sites that might be considered suspect.   Is it really surprising that Hasan, as a Muslim, attended a mosque for prayer?  Don't many people, in confusion or despair, look to their religion?

But, terrorism? Sorry, I don't buy it.  I guess it's "terrorism" in a literal sense, i.e., any crime of this kind creates, by the intent of the killer, "terror."  This is the quaint old-fashioned kind of terrorism I first encountered in Paris in about 1950, where my U.S.-Army dad was assigned to help with rebuilding of military bases.  Communists ran through the Métro stations occasionally with their hands painted red, and they (or someone) vandalized our family car and threw dead rats over the fence in front of our house. 

But terrorism has grown up since then.  Now, we normally are referring to organized, often state-supported, international, terrorism.  Mr. Hasan's act has none of the characteristic markers of that.   Naturally, al-Qaeda and an occasional mufti will praise Hasan's act, but if they had organized it, I think we could count on it having been far better orchestrated, and claimed far more immediately and loudly. 

We'll see what investigators come up with, but for me, the answer lies in asking ourselves the simple question, if Hasan weren't a Muslim, would we be hunting for terrorism?  I think the answer is a clear "no."  Unfortunately the reactions of our officials and media suggest that terrorists - real terrorists - have been successful in shaping our thinking, and it's not healthy. 

* Since I have mentioned John Muhammad, it's worth noting that the Supreme Court today began the long, possibly quixotic process of restoring the American people's trust in it by denying a request to stay Muhammad's execution.