Morning Fog

Destabilizing Yemen

Today's headlines bring news of how the Yemeni government is trying to duck, downplaying the degree of its cooperation with the U.S. in combating al-Qaeda militants operating in Yemen's territory.  This is predictable, and it reflects a weakness in how we conduct our diplomacy.

The U.S. has often been able to prevail upon other governments to be surprisingly cooperative in achieving our goals, even where there was a clear potential for negative fallout for the foreign government.  Our success in effecting such partnerships often derives directly from our power - we present our best rational arguments but we also cajole, threaten, and offer assistance in varying proportions, and after all, relatively few countries want to get on our bad side.  From our point of view, that's good diplomacy.  For the countries involved, often the tradeoff is to agree to work with us, but to keep a low profile in doing so to avoid negative political effects.   

Yemen, as reported in the linked article, is certainly one of those countries:  there is a arguable need (counterterrorism), on which we can offer significant assistance, and which is attractive to a relatively impoverished nation.  On the other hand, the Yemeni government is weak politically at the moment, and its control of parts of its own territory is tenuous.  Moreover, many of its people don't see terrorism the way we do and may even support al-Qaeda to some degree.  In short, it's a very volatile situation in which the government complicates its own ability to govern by being seen to cooperate with us.  Even in countries very positively disposed toward us, it's seldom a plus for a government to appear to be a U.S. puppet.  

Unfortunately, that's where our diplomatic practice breaks down.  We don't keep our secrets very well.  Among critics who will accuse an administration of not doing enough, and administration officials who want to show we've been proactive, and journalists who will also be looking to get a nice byline, the fact of our quiet, low-profile cooperation almost always gets leaked and/or exaggerated for our own political purposes at home. 

Governments deal with this in different ways -- the Yemenis are trying to downplay their cooperation while Pakistan, with a little more skin in the game, has purposefully rejected some of our overtures to put troops, supplies, or advisors on their territory.  But almost never does it help our cause to make public what we have pledged to keep under wraps.  At best, it puts a chill in our cooperative arrangements; it may lead to restrictions on our joint actions; it makes foreign governments less inclined to work with us the next time around.  At worst, we may end up destabilizing the very governments on which we depend for help. 

Afterthought:  I know that for many Americans (especially for some of our less internationally-minded elected representatives) this doesn't compute - huh? there are governments that have their own goals, not congruent with ours? That don't want to be seen shaking hands with us? -- but it's true.  Let's put the shoe on the other foot, using an example that's not so outlandish right now.  Several countries (China looms large among them) are major creditors to the U.S. but may be growing nervous about our expanding deficits and failure to do anything about them.  What if China, as the price of continuing to shore up our balance sheet, insisted that the U.S. President raise taxes, or pledge to reduce the deficit within a finite period?  Could any U.S. President (Bush, Obama, or even the next incumbent), or either major political party, afford to be seen publicly as having given in to such pressure?

Afghanistan - Can The Debate Last 50 Years?

Opinionmakers from across the political spectrum are now emerging in swarms to condemn, praise, or second-guess the Obama plan for the conflict in Afghanistan. By and large, commentators seem to commiserate with President Obama, and concede that "what to do about Afghanistan" is a very difficult, if not impossible, question.  There's no clear and obvious choice that can guarantee us a "positive" outcome.   

So, in today's Washington Post, George Will suggests that the plan won't work because it's not exactly what Bush did in Iraq, and he seems to lean toward bailing out as soon as possible.  E.J. Dionne correctly notes that Obama tried to seek out a middle ground that may not exist in today's political environment.  The Post itself does an OK job of pointing out how (in minor ways) Obama's plan differs from McChrystal's.  One of the best views, I think, is from Robert Kagan, who credits Obama with extreme political courage and notes that Presidents alone take the heat for their decisions.  If things turn out badly, members of Congress will duck; if the result is favorable, they'll be celebrating their wisdom.

Which brings me to my main point here.  The definition of the ideal outcome depends on who's talking, of course, and that may be part of the problem.  We rushed into the war in Afghanistan on a few weeks' notice as a way of punishing the Taliban for harboring al-Qaeda.  As in Iraq (possibly even more than in Iraq), no one did much thinking about the longer term goals -- not defining them, not considering what to do if we didn't achieve them.  It goes without saying that what we achieve, or don't, in Afghanistan will inevitably be judged in the very short term - we might hope that voters won't expect calm waters by November 2010, but we can be certain they will by November 2012.  And the political chips will fall based on our collective mood at that time. 

Ultimately, we won't know for at least 50 years whether we succeeded or failed in Afghanistan; whether our efforts made a difference, and whether it was favorable to our interests.   We have about reached that point with regard to Vietnam, where it would appear our efforts were largely irrelevant.  We failed to prevent a "communist takeover," but the region now is more peaceful than it was, and our own relationship - with Vietnam and with other regional powers - is being normalized.  By 2059, the current controversy over Afghanistan will be ancient history, but the consequences of our policies will be more clearly visible.

At Last, The Afghanistan Plan

I wanted to hear the President's speech before commenting on his long-awaited plan for Afghanistan, though most of the details had already been made public.  In particular, I was interested in what he might say about Pakistan in the context of this Afghanistan decision. Any successful effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the region will have to involve both countries.  Militarily, Pakistan will have to do its part in the border regions as U.S. forces and the Afghans they may train do theirs.  The stability of both governments is essential but contrarily, the military action Pakistan needs to undertake will not be helpful to its already fragile stability.  On this point, I was disappointed; the President's nostrums about aid to, and cooperation with, Pakistan failed to draw the strong link that's needed. 

Back home in the U.S., everyone will have his own slant, based on political dogmas and received wisdom, but I want to focus on the Democrats who are opposing the deployment of more troops.  They need to face a few realities.

First: It's true that Obama ends up "owning" the war at this point, but that should not be a surprise.  Weren't they listening?  This is the war he said during the campaign was truly important; now, he's just sticking to his guns.  He reiterated the argument at length during his speech at West Point.  Unusual, but not impossible, for a politician to follow through on campaign promises that turn out to be politically unpopular.  Democrats who stand on one principle (which is, evidently, "war is never the answer,") ought to appreciate Obama's insisting on a different one. 

Second:  Even if that weren't the case, any move to pull immediately out of Afghanistan would be unwise.  It would mean our efforts to date had accomplished nothing, it would leave a job unfinished, and it would create a situation on the ground that can easily be exploited by the Taliban and/or al-Queda.  Like it or not, we have to live with the Bush Administration's misjudgments -- that the war would be quickly and cheaply, nothwithstanding the experience of many other powers in Afghanistan -- and make the best of them in order to preserve a degree of U.S. credibility in the region and in the world.   A President inheriting a war from a predecessor will always be hard put to end it.

Third, Democrats ought to see here an opportunity to overcome their party's consistent reputation for being weak on defense and national security.  True or not, that's the broad public perception.   The President is (largely) heeding his military advisors, is focusing on a military-strategic goal (weakening terrorism), but at the same time hopes to set specific goals to be achieved as the benchmarks of success, and a timetable for finishing the job.  It's a promise to square the circle:  we're determined to stay the course, yet we plan to be out within a couple of years.  If he makes it good, the gain in national security will be the chief benefit, yet a "win" in the Democratic column could help achieve a better balance between public perceptions of the two parties on this set of issues.  If he fails, the political point is lost, perhaps, but not so disastrously as if he had acted against his military strategists' recommendations.

Meanwhile, as the buildup goes forward, we can of course expect our enemies in Afghanistan/Pakistan to step up efforts to carry off splashy setbacks to U.S. efforts, especially in the period before most of the new forces can be deployed.  We may hope that journalists and politicians won't succumb to hysteria each time one of these events happens; we will be disappointed.

Elections And Democracy

A couple of decades ago U.S. foreign and security policy began placing considerable new emphasis on "nation-building," or a process by which the employment of military force against an enemy would often culminate in an effort to revamp the target country's political system into a democracy (if it was not so before).  The end stage of that has often been presumed to be the holding of "free and fair elections."  There's nothing wrong with that effort, in fact for one simple reason I'll return to in a moment, it makes good sense for both world peace and U.S. security.

But there are some caveats.  As Paul Collier points out in the Washington Post today, for example, holding elections does not in and of itself guarantee a democratic outcome, because the candidates (or one candidate) may very well figure out a way to manipulate the system and "steal" an election.  In fact, holding an election is a lot like planting a tree when the fruit we hope for is democracy.  The tree may thrive, or it may not; it will have almost no chance if we just toss a seed on the ground without some preparation -- removing the biggest rocks, choosing a place near water, maybe even nurturing the seed into a sapling before planting it.  And its chances will improve if more time is spent preparing the ground - loosening the soil, fertilizing, watering.

Ideally, democratic institutions must come first.  A country with no tradition of democracy won't be used to the idea that the election results are accepted without protest and the opposition waits until next time to push its agenda.  A country traditionally ruled by warlords, or one with strong tribal traditions, is unlikely to be able to overcome its regionalism or ethnocentrism to form a government that works for everyone.  A President, once elected, may use his power to discriminate against his opponents, or against another tribe or region unless there are checks and balances of power that can effectively counter his effort.  Collier also suggests that the economy of a country determines whether or not elections will lead to democracy but I believe it only appears that way because the countries that have few or no democratic institutions happen to be those that have poor economies.  

It's this process, the creation and strengthening of democratic traditions and institutions, that is the only lasting basis for a well-functioning democracy.  Unfortunately, it's also the hard and time-consuming part, requiring our involvement far beyond the limits our budget, or our national patience, imposes on us.  In approaching decisions about Afghanistan now, the administration needs to be aware (and I think they are) of the trade-off between a long engagement and a successful end. 

Is it worth the candle?  It may be.  Although elections per se don't necessarily lead to peace in troubled areas, as Collier asserts, it has been demonstrated that real, functioning democracies are less likely to threaten their neighbors or cause regional conflict than other types of government.  Democracy -- solidly based democracy -- does make for a less dangerous world, even if elections might not.

The American Agenda - Foreign Policy

Another insightful opinion piece last Thursday was David Ignatius's consideration of Obama's foreign policy doctrine.  Reviewing Obama speeches and other policy declarations of administration officials, Ignatius concludes there is a theme of balancing "rights and responsibilities," which needs fleshing out into a policy mechanism for decision-making.  Ignatius suggests that applying this nascent Obama doctrine to Afghanistan would mean we cannot abandon responsibilities we have taken on to train Afghan security forces and support economic and political development.

That doesn't seem to lead us to an answer on the big question of a troop surge, though.  Obama's approach, as described by Ignatius, is very lawyerly.  By coincidence (?) Obama is a lawyer.  I've generally found lawyers are not decision-makers; their focus is on getting all the facts, exploring all the angles, checking on the precedents, and taking their time about it.  Decisions in any field, but especially in the foreign policy/national security arena, almost inevitably need to be made on the basis of incomplete information, uncertainty about the other parties' intentions, and lack of predictability in outcomes. 

The difficulty of transitioning from lawyer mode to decision mode is one reason that Senators have often had difficulty moving from their deliberative chamber into the realm of executing policy; some of the wiser ones have refused to make such a move, despite seemingly favorable political conditions.  Obama's "doctrine," if Ignatius has correctly identified it, will need to make the leap soon; failure to do so before now has left the impression of fecklessness on matters that the new President has identified as priorities.

Prize Season - Obama

This morning, much of the world is caught by surprise with the announcement from Oslo that U.S. President Barack Obama has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 

Fall is the season of the Big Prizes, especially the Nobels, and no Nobel seems to attract more attention and controversy than the Peace Prize.  Certainly, there will be controversy in this case too.  First and foremost, it will come from Obama's political enemies in the U.S., but this criticism should be ignored, since these opponents have demonstrated they wouldn't praise anything he does, even if Moses himself were to appear with a stone tablet pronouncing Obama the greatest human being ever known.   

More justified, perhaps, will be criticisms that Obama hasn't actually accomplished much (and presumably had accomplished even less at the point shortly after his election when nominations were due).  That's a fair statement, as far as it goes.  But the fact is, if we review the list of Peace Prize winners of years past, that the prize has seldom been awarded to people who have accomplished specific achievements in "peace" (and certainly not lasting peace, which seems sadly elusive even after a century-plus of these awards).  Instead, if there is any "theme" to the award, it seems tilted toward individuals who have demonstrated a commitment to peaceful solutions of problems, sometimes through perseverance over many years (à la Jimmy Carter), sometimes via a willingness to abandon unpeaceful habits (Arafat), and sometimes simply by their expressed intentions.

Of course the choice is subjective.  I would guess that Obama's stated preference for discourse and diplomacy over might and main; his speech on race during the campaign, his address to the Muslim world in Cairo; his effort to minimize confrontation in favor of collaboration on contentious issues like nuclear nonproliferation; his move to rapidly wind down U.S. military presence in Iraq; his recognition that matters like climate change and the treatment of detainees also have implications for peace in the world -- all these have struck responsive chords in Europe, and must have appealed strongly to the Nobel Committee members.  

Let's not forget the George Bush factor, either.  Just as Obama probably owes his election as President to the extreme unpopularity and ruinous policies (especially in the economy) of his predecessor, he almost certainly gained an edge against other candidates because of Bush's extremely negative image in Europe.  This irony won't be lost on those who supported Bush in the past but try to sweep his memory under the rug now.  In fact, it will make them more vitriolic.   Too bad. 

We who remember how it was when we were all Americans, rather than just Democrats or Republicans, should celebrate the fact that a sitting U.S. President has been selected for this prestigious (if subjective) honor, and hope that it will in some indirect way help him achieve concrete results in the world. 

Full Moon Crazy 5: Roman Polanski

The last of five vignettes on events that demonstrate the weirdness a full moon can bring on...  

And finally, the strange case of Roman (or Roamin', as the case may be) Polanski.  Weird guy, yes.  Pled guilty to rape of a minor, yes.  Put one over on the authorities and took French leave, yes.  I suppose legal authorities in California are within their rights to try to bring him to justice, yet the question "why now" does arise.  I believe the real reason is that he made fools of them.  The parallel to Bush 1, Sadam Hussein, and Bush 2 is clear. 

I don't mean to defend Polanski; it may indeed be just and proper to pursue extradition and prosecution of Polanski now.  Those involved, however, should also see the other side of the coin:   The effect of our using extradition treaties to pursue cases that are viewed abroad as extreme will be to weaken extradition treaties.  Countries already unwilling to extradite to the U.S. because we have the death penalty will be less willing to honor agreements, or to negotiate new ones. 

Full Moon Crazy 3: Iran's Nukes

Today seems to have been a full moon day in terms of current events.  "Luna"-tic events occurred.  Here is the third of five vignettes.   

The world is a-flutter because Iran not only turned out to have nuclear facilities it had denied having, but yesterday test-fired some missiles.  Should we be surprised that other countries seek the security (and indeed the prestige) of going nuclear, especially when it rattles their mortal enemies and brings such international attention?    I'm certainly in favor of nuclear nonproliferation generally because, after all, this is an area where a slight miscalculation could blow away a significant portion of mankind.  The more such weapons, and the more different governments that have them, obviously, the greater the risk of some mistake (Second Amendment buffs please take note).  Ultimately the answer to the nuclear arms race lies in diplomacy that seeks to reduce overall levels, including our own.  That's the policy of this administration and previous ones.

On the other hand, to be fair, it's not lost on North Korea or Iran that we seem to get more nervous about their nuclear programs than we do about our friends'.   We fear Ahmadinejad is a dangerous nut case, but we should recognize there were people around the world who figured George W. Bush for a dangerous nut case too.  It's just that Bush was our nut case. 

U.S. Expectations Of Russia

After a Fourth-of-July break, I was thinking of scribbling a little something about President Obama's upcoming trip to Russia and other destinations, but I see that columnist David Ignatius has already done that work for me.

Of course Obama needed to make this trip early in his term, and with some of the key pieces of the domestic agenda now perking along, the timing is good from the U.S. domestic political point of view.  But meetings can't produce results when one or both parties aren't in the right frame of mind; Russia's current leadership is very much in a Rodney Dangerfield don't-get-no-respect mode, one which has prevailed through much of Russian history going back at least to Peter the Great.   Expectations about what "results" might emerge from Obama's visit should be extremely low.

Silliness On Iran

Sunday brought out a whole raft of foreign policy experts like Sen. Charles Grassley, Sen. Lindsey Graham, and Sen. John McCain, as well as actor Fred Thompson, to suggest that the Obama administration's response to events in Iran has been weak or insufficient. 

Sen. Richard Lugar, the senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, who actually knows a thing or two about international policy, said that the Obama response was about right.  More important, Iranians in the U.S., who might also be expected understand the finer points of how the wrong official U.S. statement could redound against the cause of democracy in Iran, have also indicated they think the administration has taken an appropriate line.   

As some analysts are pointing out, there's a useful distinction to be drawn between our sticking in our two-cents'-worth regarding the fairness of the election (without further evidence of fraud), and expressing ourselves regarding the harsh police crackdown against protesters (which Obama has called "unjust").  I imagine we'll see a stronger Obama statement on this point soon. 

As for the contested elections, perhaps U.S. critics would prefer to apply the Iraq model:  take out the guy we don't like, force elections, and enthrone democracy .  But even if you think that worked in Iraq (I don't), the fact is that strong, lasting democratic institutions cannot be imposed or created at the snap of anyone's fingers.  They develop from within a country, from indigenous political currents.  Developments yesterday provide good evidence of this thesis.  Former President Rafsanjani has been critical of Ahmadinejad, and he failed to appear publicly to support the government's call to unite behind the "official" election results; Rafsanjani's daughter has supported Mousavi, and she and some other relatives have reportedly been arrested.  Evidently, differences exist within the ruling clerical clique.  This is the kind of ferment that over time can give birth to democracy.  But both Rafsanjani and Mousavi would be in far more tenuous political situations if our statements allowed Khamenei to paint them credibly as a stalking horse for the Great Satan.