Morning Fog

As Yugoslavia Went...

After I retired some years ago, I got into the habit of tuning in to U.S. Presidents' State of the Union messages.   I guess I never thought I had time before.   I suppose it makes me a better-informed, and therefore better, citizen to watch them, yet I sometimes wonder if this is a worthwhile way to use the time.  These talks, no matter who the speaker or what party he represents, have become too formulaic, too laden with a laundry list of proposals that will seldom be implemented, to be a meaningful guide to the nation's "state," less still to its future. 

Obama's SOTU this year was cut from the same cloth, so it was only natural for my mind to wander a bit.

As a diplomat, I spent several years in what until recently was known as "Yugoslavia."  At the time I was first assigned to that country, Josip Broz Tito was still alive and well.  The conventional wisdom was that only Tito himself could hold this pastiche of different mini-nations together in a (somewhat) cohesive whole, and most observers were concerned about chaos after his death. 

Tito died.  The country did not fall apart.  It survived Tito by roughly a decade.  In hindsight, I think it's clear now that Yugoslavia wasn't held together by any kind of internal force (Tito pulling strings and cracking heads), but by an external pressure -- the mutual fear of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians and others of being dominated, if not annexed outright, by the Soviet Union.   The resolution of that threat, as the Soviet Union caved in on itself, led directly and quickly to the breakup of Yugoslavia into its component parts. 

Back to the SOTU:  President Obama's talk really spotlighted the increasing partisanship in our political system, the deadlock that prevails, and the growing divergence of view about fundamental precepts of government, economics, and even defense.  This all began in the early 1990s.   Could it be that our own unity, somewhat like Yugoslavia's -- albeit less directly and at greater remove -- was in part a function of the external threat that the USSR represented to us?  

I don't mean to suggest that the United States is about to break up into a half-dozen or more different countries; we are, I hope, a long way from that.   Yet the possibility of a cause-and-effect relationship between our current political mood and the end of the Cold War is a tantalizing thought.  A book needs to be written, and no doubt someday will, about the global consequences of the Soviet meltdown.  

  

U.S. "Leadership" (sic) On Middle East Peace

I claim no special expertise in matters Middle Eastern/Near Eastern.  Yet, applying a more general knowledge of diplomacy and a bit of common sense, I find a lot of what's being said currently about the Israel, Palestine, and peace in the region - and the U.S. role - rather curious. 

Writing Thursday in The New York Times (ever a staunch supporter of Israel), Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers offered this assessment:

"The extraordinary tableau Wednesday at the United Nations underscored a stark new reality: the United States is facing the prospect of having to share, or even cede, its decades-long role as the architect of Middle East peacemaking."

It seems to me there's a lot wrong with that fairly simple sentence. For one, it's unusual for the Times to provide underpinning for the jingoistic idea that we must be in the lead on everything.

Beyond that, however, the concept that the U.S. has a leading role seems pitifully lacking.  If we have indeed been the "architects," what has been built over those decades?  Not even a Kansas sodbuster's hole-in-the-ground.  It may be time for a new architect to seize the project and run with it.   

It's true, as this article asserts, that current conditions (in which a strong conservative Republican cohort encourages Israeli inflexibility) makes this a particularly difficult time politically for the U.S. to try to accomplish anything regarding Israel.  But I would argue that things haven't changed all that much.   The U. S. has historically been in thrall to its Israel lobby, and that in turn has prevented it from truly being seen as an honest broker.  Our "leadership role" over "decades" is largely wishful thinking.  No one else was doing it, and we kept trying, but that's the best that can be said.

It would be ironic if Obama's effort to break out of that mold (encouraging a Palestinian state a year ago) and the Israel lobby's efforts to reverse that (with seeming success, as his latest UN speech suggests) were the factors that might lead toward a workable solution, designed by a different architect, engineered by a new group of builders, and leaving us with little or no influence in the process.  Ironic, but possibly beneficial to the cause of real peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

 

 

 

How To Recognize A State

Some journalists are critical of U.S. policy that welcomes the new leadership of Libya, while opposing Palestinian statehood at the U.N.  Specifically, two NYT writers claim that:

"The trouble for Mr. Obama, though, is that even as he was publicly proclaiming his backing at the United Nations for a new Libyan state, American officials were working furiously behind the scenes to make sure the United Nations did not bestow a similar recognition on a Palestinian state."

I find this an odd criticism (especially appearing, not in an op-ed piece but in a 'news' item), because it purposely sets up a false analogy.  In the Libyan case, there is no "new state," but only new government of an existing state, one with a well-defined and broadly recognized geographic territory.  That's quite a far cry from the Palestinian situation, where nothing is "generally recognized" and no state currently exists. 

Further, the new leadership in Libya has a credible claim to control of said geographic area.  True, some (Gaddafi for one) may challenge that claim of control, which is one reason U.S. policy has always been to avoid formal "recognition" of a new government - it's too political.  We continue diplomatic relationships, sometimes rekindle them if the previous leadership was hostile, but we deny that we ever "recognize."   President Obama's "welcoming" may amount to the same thing in the real world, but certainly it's impossible anyway either to welcome or to tacitly recognize a "state" that doesn't exist.

Creating a new state, if parties agree to it, is a decidedly more complex and long-term matter, as Obama has subsequently sought to make clear.   (Just consider that even within our own country, the creation of a new "state" - really a substate in international terms - for the District of Columbia is considered not just difficult, but impossible.) 

 

Wheat And Chaff

It's just human nature to stress what's important to you personally, over matters that are much more momentous for most of us.  There's even a Saturday column in the Washington Post, called "Free For All," especially designed for people with such complaints.  Maybe it's good of the Post (and self-serving, certainly) to provide a forum for these single-focus readers, but the column is also a reliable source of chuckles, too.

In one recent letter, a reader complained that the Queen of Denmark had visited the U.S. and didn't get nearly the high-profile media treatment that British royals get when they come.  Nothing against Denmark, an old ally, a stable democracy, and so on ... and I confess I think all the fawning attention lavished in this country on Her Brittannic Majesty and her extended family is both ridiculous and incomprehensible.  But c'mon, let's put these two nations on the scale.   U.K./Denmark ... UK/Denmark... gee, how could newspaper editors possibly figure out which is more newsworthy?

Beyond the letter columns, a slightly larger constituency has been able to make "news," in the shadow of the First Lady's travel to Africa, with its complaints that President Obama, as our first African-American President, hasn't devoted enough attention to Africa.  The complainers fail to realize that if our first Af-Am President were to jump on a personal hobby-horse by making Africa the centerpiece of our foreign policy, or by focusing at home on programs aimed specifically at African-American citizens, he would pretty well scotch the chances of any other African-American's getting elected for another two hundred years or so. 

All Presidents have to be the President of us all.  And, as a former "foreign policy expert," I would add my view that sub-Saharan Africa suffered heavily from the end of the Cold War in terms of the attention it gets from the U.S., Europe, and even Russia; we should be devoting more energy to the problems and future of this huge expanse of territory and human potential.  That said, however, if we get out our scale again, put Africa on one side, and Afghanistan/Iraq/Libya/China/Europe on the other, we might conclude that an Africa visit by Michelle Obama and her daughters is far more than might be expected.

We suffer some tunnel vision in our national politics, too.  Our Senate is organized in a way that provides one or two Senators from states representing a minuscule proportion of our population to exert inordinate influence on political outcomes, bringing us 1950s rural solutions to 2011's urban problems.  Today's latest utterance from Senator Kent Conrad of North Dakota brings this fact once again to our attention.  Conrad is probably correct, as far as he goes -- whacking a couple of trillion in spending won't fundamentally alter our deficit problem -- but as far as I know, he hasn't offered any ideas that could achieve what he seeks. 

Only by getting spending on both military and civilian entitlements under control can we reassert that kind of control over our budget.  This involves changing people's expectations, and even if Conrad persuades each of his wheat-producing state's 672,591 people (far less than 1% of the nation's population) of the necessity for that, we'll need a lot more.  Can he really get the attention of legislators of more populous states, or is he just the chaff that will be blown away as winds (hot air?) sweep across the plains from New York, California, and Illinois? 

U.S. Israel Policy

I don't understand all the flap and complaint over Obama's recent statements about Israel.   Well, actually I do understand it, but I deny its legitimacy.

U.S. policy on Israel must be exactly that - formulated by the U.S., to reflect and further our own interests, rather than just parroting the line of Israel's government.  If our goal is to put an end to the constant conflict and bring peace to the region, it seems pretty clear that now was the time to shake the tree just a bit to reflect a very proper impatience with what's not happening.

The two countries are allies, but we cannot be in lockstep.  If the U.S. doesn't have an independent voice, we really have no voice at all, in which case, we may as well not be in the game.  It's certainly an option for us to back out and to aver that the parties in the region must solve their own differences.  George W. Bush tried that.  But on balance, it's clear the Israelis prefer us to be involved, rather than not.

Of course there's a lot of political nervousness on any issue involving Israel.  American politicians seem to fear that the tiniest step outside the policy shadow of the government of Israel will turn away American Jewish voters, so they clamor in full left-right chorus to criticize any such steps.  I think - and hope - that's a misreading of how "the Jewish voter" sees the problem.  I believe - and hope, again - that they and the rest of us are more realistic than that. 

Krauthammer Speaks Out On Libya

Charles Krauthammer's column on Libya is his usual one-track, blind, absurd, neoCon drivel.

(By the way, there's nothing "neo"
about neoCons any more -
they're very old and stale.)

As the intrepid columnist insists, yes, the Libya situation is quite a mess - both the Libya part, and the effort to do something about it.  That was clear from the start, and it's one reason I think Obama made the wrong decision to get involved at all.  That said, however, I also believe he went at it the right way, by getting others to pick up part of the burden -- particularly those who were advocating it.

The conservative approach, channeled here by Krauthammer, is to leap into such messes with both feet and see if we can't make them worse, while the expense of doing so drives our own country into financial ruin.  That's the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, and of a "Decider" who thought nothing of committing billions in American money and thousands of lives just to get a rematch with the guy who made of fool of his Daddy.  Reagan, at least, knew how to choose his fights, by picking on tiny Grenada.

When it comes to overseas adventurism, regressives scream loudly that the U.S. must be leading every effort.   Yet in demonstrating leadership on domestic matters, Republicans fail miserably, preferring to abdicate to Gaddafiesque big business on the "little, insignificant" issues like the economy, pollution, health care, climate change, consumer protections, food purity, and so many more. 

Libya Sweeps The Op-Ed Page

Yesterday's editorial page in the Washington Post produced something I'm not sure I've ever seen before.  All five of the columnists represented there had written about the same topic:  The administration's decision to get involved in enforcing a no-fly zone to protect the anti-Qaddafi forces.

Specifically,

• Anne Applebaum seemed most concerned about the "what then" factor, i.e., if our no-fly zone was insufficient to make Qaddafi fold his tents, wouldn't we be pulled into a widening role as we tried to bring about the desired end result?  (It's this concern that was foremost in my mind when I said I thought the decision to get involved was a mistake.)
• Richard Cohen was more concerned about how Obama reached his decision, stressing "incoherence" and "confusion" in the process.
• Michael Gerson was also concerned about how and when the decision was made. He took the predictable fallback position of Republicans, that the U.S. must always be out there leading the charge because ... well, just because.
• Eugene Robinson wrote a thoughtful piece clearly lamenting that the Obama decision is based upon realism in foreign policy.  I say, what's wrong with realism?  His realism is that we only go militarily after errant countries who aren't friendly to us; my realism is that we shouldn't jump into something without a clearer idea of exactly what we are getting into.
• Finally, George Will expatiates on that very theme (like Applebaum) -- how can we avoid mission creep, and why should we think that it's our duty to expend blood and treasure being the world's policeman ... is it enough to say "because we can?"

The common thread in all this learned punditry was that nobody is especially happy with the President's decision -- it was wrong, it was right; he took too long to decide, he decided rashly;  he did the right thing but for the wrong reasons, or he stated the right reasons but took the wrong action.   The old adage is that if you manage to piss off everyone equally, you must have got it just about right.  I'm not retracting my original thumbs-down on U.S. participation in the Libya no-fly zone, but the wide range of opinion certainly expresses the difficulties any administration faces in such situations.  It's no-win.

Does The U.S. Now Have A War In Libya?

It now appears that we will be engaged in at least some level of military activity in Libya.

Too bad.  I think it's a mistake.  True, as time has passed, we found allies to join us, an Arab League call for intervention, and a UN Security Council resolution permitting action against Qaddafi.  I suspect we may also have engineered with some of the participating Allies (particularly France) that they will take the lead while we hold back.  (Early reports are suggesting that France has been the first to strike militarily against the Libyan loyalist forces.)

Interventionists in the U.S. have argued that this is a human rights issue (because Qaddafi is killing his own people), or one of political freedom (because the rebels are seeking democratic change).  Both arguments seem weak to me.   We've never really taken military action just because a deranged dictator was murdering his own people.  We fought Hitler mainly for other reasons (and found out about the killing later); we did nothing about Stalin, Ceaucescu, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, or a host of others.   As for democracy, I don't think we really know what the Libyan rebels stand for politically.  Being against Qaddafi doesn't necessarily make them democrats.

Ultimately, it seems to me, Obama has given in to political pressures, some international but the more pressing ones home-grown.  He felt he couldn't afford to be seen as a do-nothing while Qaddafi snuffs out "democracy" in Libya.   In U.S. domestic politics, it's always the out-of-power party that shouts loudest about supporting human rights and democracy in other countries but when they're in power, they seem content to accept the status quo and the stability it offers.  In this case, I really wonder if the Republicans could use inaction effectively as a political blunt instrument.  I don't believe most Americans care that deeply.

So, we have established a new, potentially costly and dangerous precedent for intervention.  It may also turn out that we're supporting a lost cause.  One justification offered for intervening today was that the rebel forces were being defeated more quickly than anticipated.  To me, that's an argument for remaining on the sidelines - that kind of weakness only suggests they may not triumph even with foreign intervention.  Or that our intervention could lead to back to the status quo ante, with Qaddafi basically still in charge but perhaps chastened enough to be wary of too vicious a crackdown on his opponents.

It's axiomatic in diplomacy that when unexpected events occur - especially if we can't immediately be certain they run in our favor - politicians start demanding that we "do something about it."   As if we could!  And if we could, it wouldn't necessarily be in our interest to do so.   If Libya's rebels do succeed in toppling Qaddafi and taking the reins of power, does that benefit us?  Will the new government thank us, or might they become just another radical thorn in our side?  I have my doubts.  Will radical muslim governments elsewhere think better of us, or cooperate more willingly, because of our support for this Libyan movement?  Dream on.

Earlier, I pointed out that among the various uprisings of popular anti-government sentiment across the Middle East and North Africa, some would fail, some succeed.  Events to this point suggest that Libya would, if left to its own devices, be one of the former.  For the long term, our best option may have been to allow them to do so.  Democracy-building is a slow process; would-be democrats will be stronger in the long run if they make, and learn from, their own mistakes.  They won't learn from ours. 

Some say even we don't learn from ours.

 

Petrodollars, Terrorism, And Democracy

Obviously there's a lot of excitement in the Near East and across the Maghreb in recent months.  People in countries from Morocco to Iran seem to have woken up to the possibilities of democracy; change is clearly in the wind, though its direction will be different in each country.  

In considering the long-term effects of what's happening, I'm a bit of a contrarian to a lot of what I'm reading in the media right now:

Democracy:  The democratic movements won't succeed everywhere.  In some places, the reformers will reach accommodation with governments, dictators, or kings; in others, they'll be coopted, perhaps even crushed.  Where they do succeed fully, we can expect a long period of adjustment, with plenty of instability, as nations without much in the way of democratic institutions or traditions attempt to build them.   It will be messy.  Politically speaking, democracies are inherently stable over the long term but can be very unstable in actuality over short-term fluctuations.  Dictatorships are inherently unstable, but can produce long periods of stability until something disturbs their status quo.  

Petroleum:  While speculators and fearful investors are ratcheting up the cost of petroleum products, and we're back to those annoying, breathless reports in news media about how the price of gas has crept up another 2 cents today, I think a lot of the fear is being oversold.  True, we probably won't go back to $1-a-gallon gasoline "anytime soon" (as newscasters are wont to say these days - I'd say "never").  On the other hand, I believe that as, or if, democratic systems - even radical ones - supplant authoritarian ones, there is no evidence to suggest any petroleum producer is going to try to cut off supplies to its "enemies."  Trade trumps politics, and countries sell what they have to sell.  Thus there is probably an upper limit on how high prices can go.   Further, there's a paradox that favors the oil importing countries, one that some big petroproducers have actively sought to downplay:  Every uptick in oil prices hastens effort to dispense with oil as a fuel.

Terrorism:  As noted, the current political turmoil creates instability. Terrorists always look to exploit instability from any source.  Not to downplay the dangers, but the positive factors also need to be considered:  Groups like al-Qaeda may find themselves suddenly working against the tide of democratic movements.  They will certainly need to rethink their strategies.  Adapting to democratic environments might prove difficult for many reasons, not the least of which is that such groups don't want "power to the people."  Most of them think god, not man, should set the rules - they work toward theocracy, not democracy.  As nations democratize, they are less, not more, likely to offer breeding grounds or political support for terrorists, though of course for some time to come, "uncertainty" remains the watchword for the counterterrorism effort.     

Events In Egypt

I've resisted commenting on events in Egypt because things were so much in flux.  Now, though I doubt that the story of the "revolution" is over, the situation has reached a plateau that should permit everyone to step back and take stock.

"Revolution" is in quotes above because I strongly agree with the commentary of Jon Alterman in the Washington Post:  Mubarak's relinquishing of power is a huge step by contrast with what we might have predicted just a couple of weeks ago, yet it certainly falls far short of effecting real change in Egypt's political system.

If the military chooses to help move the country toward democratic rule and the creation of democratic institutions, that will be a major accomplishment for the protesters.  More likely, from what we know now, the military will settle in to run the country in ways that hardly differ from Mubarak's approach, in which case the protests will have accomplished little.

From the standpoint of the international community, the current state is about the best that could be hoped for -- that Egypt for now will have a modicum of stability, a hand at the rudder to keep matters from dissolving into chaos while the next steps are sorted out.  There's still a long way to go before we will know what has been wrought.