Re: Egypt, it's good to hear that the Obama administration had reportedly worked out a modus vivendi, in conjunction with other countries of the region, that was intended to prevent the violence that's now occurring. It's what diplomacy is supposed to do -- reach compromise solutions aimed at preventing violence or other undesirable outcomes. It's too bad it didn't work out in this case, but the reality of diplomacy is that all the parties have to accept any arrangement, and in this case, the Egyptian military government did not.
The cauldron of Cairo is the most recent example -- but by no means a unique one -- of a place where stated U.S. foreign policy interests work at cross-purposes. We applaud trends toward democratic government, yet in many places, democratic development is messy and often leads to economic and political instability and even war -- all of which work against other U.S. goals.
Specifically, in the Egyptian case, at the time of "Arab spring" a couple of years ago, it seemed rather evident that either (a) democratic elections were likely to lead to a new Egyptian government led by the Muslim Brotherhood; or (b) the continuation in office of a military dictatorship would make Egypt increasingly unstable. Neither outcome was what Washington might have hoped for; so we supported the democratic ideal, evidently in hope that it would produce the impossible: a moderate, unified, competent, collaborative government. It didn't.
It's often supposed, by those who aren't directly involved in foreign policy and diplomacy, that a major power like the U.S. can influence events enough to determine an outcome we like. Not so! Not in most cases, anyway. Our ability to shape things is often quite marginal -- to reduce violence in small ways, or to mitigate its effects, but not to prevent a war.
The true reason we provide assistance, is not to buy influence anyway, but to strengthen economies, political systems, or militaries in ways that we believe benefit us. So, I not-so-respectfully disagree with journalists who opine that aid program is intended to buy us influence. If it were, it would surely one of the least effective tools in our diplomatic arsenal. Oh, sure, it might, sometimes, in limited ways, and when things are stable, garner us a bit of pull -- but not when the shit hits the fan and a foreign government sees its survival, or even the integrity of its nation, as threatened. Without knowing much of anything about the details of the situation in Egypt, I feel comfortable suggesting that in the Egyptian military's internal deliberations about what to do over the past month, the question "what will the Americans think/do/say?" very likely never came up.
That's why cutting off our assistance usually has no result except to make us feel better for having expressed our disapproval. The possibility of a cut-off will have already been factored into the foreign government's calculations, so it won't change anything on their side. It's more likely -- if it has any effect at all -- that our longer term interests are damaged. We can't buy influence in a direct way, but our assistance program does buy us the right to be heard, to offer advice or opinion. When it's cut off, we lose even that.
Realistic diplomacy must recognize that there are limits to what we can do, and that there are times (quite a lot of them) when none of the possible outcomes fits with our notion of what's good for Uncle Sam.