In being brutally frank regarding our NATO allies' wimpiness in participating in commonly agreed defense projects, outgoing Defense Secretary Gates has called attention to a couple of problems in the U.S.-Europe relationship. Both relate to the very imbalanced see-saw between the U.S., on the one end, and our NATO allies on the other. One problem has to do with participation in, and funding of, defense efforts but the other, not much addressed in recent reportage of Gates's speech, has to do with an imbalance in how the two ends of the see-saw define the tasks the Alliance undertakes (or should undertake).
Gates noted that our allies have generally been cutting their defense budgets, leaving the U.S. to pick up more costs, and that their forces have been less involved in recent NATO efforts, while attaching conditions to their involvement when they are engaged. He almost makes it sound like a new problem, but it isn't.
In fact, serious differences between what allied countries including Canada spend on defense, and what the U.S. spends, have existed for decades. It's true that the U.S. GDP, even in these economically slow times, is greater than the NATO allies'. So shouldn't we spend more? That makes sense, but a more prudent and fair measure of expenditures would contrast defense expenditures of NATO members as a percentage of GDP. Conveniently, NATO itself provides this information in an annual report, "Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1990-2010." (You'll need to scroll down to Table 3 in this report.) To cut to the chase, you'll see that in 2009 (the last year for which complete figures are available) the U.S. spent fully 5.0% of GDP on defense, while our most engaged allies (France, Germany, the U.K) spent respectively 2.1, 1.4, and 2.7%. Other allied countries, with a couple of anomalies, have consistently spent well less than 2%. Previous years, going back two decades, on average show the same pattern.
The other side of the coin is that the U.S. has generally been content to outspend its allies in this manner because it enabled us to steer the ship. Despite some occasional turbulence with prickly allies, Washington has been able to call the shots more often than not; to guide NATO decisions and policies in the directions the U.S. wanted; to retain command (or a very senior voice in command) of military forces in operations.
This is the part that may now be under greatest stress. Since the Cold War ended, the common bonds that originally brought this collection of allies together in NATO has faded away - not perhaps for the new members from the former Soviet sphere of influence, who look to their freshly minted membership in NATO to protect them from an overweening Russia, but certainly for many of the members of longer standing. Europe does not share our perception of the threat posed by terrorists in faraway Afghanistan, and sees less justification for military operations so far from home. Within the Alliance, only the U.S. maintains a firm global outlook (the U.K. and France shared it once but seem to be fading), or the ability to project military force halfway around the globe. For the rest, to be "Candide," it's back to Voltaire: "Il faut cultiver nôtre jardin."
Ultimately, U.S. foreign policy has long been based on the assumption that the interests, traditions, and outlook that we share with Europe are one of the pillars of our foreign and defense policy. Is that linkage falling apart, or is it just under stress? That's something Presidents will need to decide, but I suspect we'll stick with what we know for quite a while to come, and seek to preserve our ties and cooperation with Europe.
Meantime, the cost issue is not insignificant. I've always thought it's the unmentioned and unmentionable root of what I see as a key U.S. domestic problem, what I call the "Third World Superpower." We are loath in the U.S. to acknowledge what statistics make clear: by many measures, in education, health, infant mortality, crime, poverty, infrastructure, and hunger to name a few, we now lag behind many of the European countries. What could that extra three percent of GDP, the difference between what our Allies generally spend and what we generally spend, do for us if it were redirected toward some of our pressing domestic needs?
Our current level of "defense" spending impoverishes us. Many don't think so (yet); others would deny that there's a link; some would argue that we can still have guns and butter. I think it's inevitable, long term if not short, that we will need to face this music, define our international interests more precisely, reemphasize inexpensive diplomacy over expensive military hardware, and scale back our ambitions to fit.